We live in an age that measures almost everything in terms of usefulness. Every hour should produce something, every thought should lead to a decision, every pause should serve to recharge us so that we can return more productive. In such a context, thinking without an immediate practical purpose is often dismissed as a pointless luxury, an escape from reality. Those who do it risk feeling guilty, or being regarded with a little suspicion. Yet the question of what free time is worth is an ancient one, and the Romans had already given it some thought.

Latin has a precise word for this: otium. The term meant time taken away from business and devoted to reading, writing, conversation, caring for oneself and one's friends. It was not laziness. Indeed, it was the opposite of laziness: a way of cultivating the mind when one was not obliged to do something else. Its opposite was negotium: work, public life, business. And the word itself reveals the relationship: negotium means, literally, "non-leisure". Free time was defined in relation to work, but had a value of its own.

Cicero used the expression otium cum dignitate to describe a withdrawal from politics that was not a surrender. One could leave the public stage without losing one's dignity and without ceasing to think. It was not a holiday; it was another form of engagement, perhaps more demanding than that of the forum and the senate.

Seneca devoted an entire work to the subject, De otio, and the argument he develops is more subtle than is usually remembered. He does not urge us to flee the world. He distinguishes withdrawal for the sake of study from withdrawal merely for the sake of hiding, and argues that those who live exclusively for business spend their lives without truly possessing them. Time, he writes in essence, is the only thing that truly belongs to us, and we lose it without realising when we give it over to others. The point is not to choose between action and reflection, but to prevent action from taking up all the space.

Aristotle, too, had considered the problem. The Greek word scholè, from which our word school derives, meant free time, and for the philosopher the purpose of work was ultimately to make that time possible. For him, some activities have value in themselves, such as contemplation, while others have value because of what they produce. I am not arguing that Aristotle was right about everything, or that his categories can be readily applied to our present. But the distinction between what is useful and what has value in itself remains useful, and we often blur it.

Modern science has arrived at something that seems to say the same thing, albeit by different means. In 2001 Marcus Raichle and his colleagues observed that certain regions of the brain remain particularly active when a person is not performing an external task. They called them the default mode network. This network lights up when the mind remembers, imagines the future, reflects on itself and on others. The brain, then, does not switch off when it stops responding to a demand. It works in a different way.

This needs to be said with caution. Since then, research into this network has become far more complex, and the default mode network is involved in various functions, not all of which can be reduced to the simple notion of a "wandering mind". It is not right to reduce it to a formula. Yet the underlying indication remains: the mind generates activity even when it is not directed towards a goal, and that activity plays a part in the way it connects experiences, constructs meanings and prepares future decisions.

Here lies a difference worth noting. Goal-directed thought tends to narrow the field: it seeks the answer, discards alternatives that are of no use, focuses on a single problem. It is effective, but narrow. Free thought, by contrast, leaves room for lateral connections. Many useful ideas arise while we are doing something else, in the shower, on a walk, while looking out of the window. It is not magic. It is simply that the mind has the space to bring together things that concentration keeps apart.

There is a risk, however, and it is perhaps the most interesting one. Once a value is recognised, it tends to become an indicator. Even rest ends up being measured: we sleep to perform better, meditate to think more clearly, go for a walk because it is good for our work. In this way, otium risks becoming an item in the plan, another activity to optimise. Free time remains free only if we accept that some things have no measurable return, and need not have one to be justified.

This argument also concerns work, and in particular those who lead a team. In organisations, people who have time to think are often the ones who notice problems first, ask awkward questions, make connections between apparently unrelated situations. Yet when costs have to be cut or deadlines tightened, purposeless thought is the first thing to disappear from the agenda. A meeting can always be shorter; a train of thought without a goal always seems superfluous. Those in positions of responsibility should defend that space, even when it produces nothing immediately visible.

This is not about setting reflection against action. Those who think without a purpose subsequently act better, and those who act without ever stopping often repeat the same mistakes. The problem arises when one of the two cancels out the other, when usefulness becomes the only criterion by which a person's time is judged. Otium and negotium sustain one another, as in Latin, where one is defined by the negation of the other.

Perhaps the most useful question is not whether purposeless thought serves any purpose. It is to ask how much room we leave for it in our days, and whom we leave that room for when the decision is ours. It does not serve a purpose; it simply is. Two thousand years later, we still have to defend it, not out of nostalgia for a slower world, but because the mind needs a place where it need not account for anything.

Do you allow yourselves that time? Or do you consider it a luxury that can be postponed?